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Language and other cognitive capabilities of the human 
brain have traditionally been seen as the hallmark of 
what it is to be human. Empiricist philosophers argue 
that our experiences determine our thoughts and what 
we become. On the other hand, Kant acknowledges the 
significance of our experiences, but claims that they 
are organised in terms of innate fundamental concepts 
(i.e., concepts that are present in humans regardless of 
their particular experiences and perceptions), which are 
related to our language capabilities. It is not surpris-
ing then that the relationship between language and 
thought has attracted significant attention in psychology. 
The interaction of language and thought has previously 
been explored bilaterally. However, in the current litera-
ture review we shall focus only on the influence of lan-
guage on thought. 
The Whorian Hypothesis
Early experiments (Smith, Brown, Toman, & Goodman, 
1947) demonstrate that cognition can operate indepen-
dently of language capacity. However, many scholars argue 
that the way we speak influences the way we think, even 
if they disagree on the extent of that influence. At one 
extreme, the Whorfian hypothesis (Whorf, 1956) asserts 
that the language we speak determines the thoughts we 
can have (linguistic determinism). In relation to this, Green 
(2010) suggests two criteria that the evidence for linguis-
tic determinism should meet:
In order to support efficiently linguistic determin-
ism, one would need to provide evidence that 
speakers of one language cannot think or enter-
tain thoughts that come naturally to speakers of 
another language and also that those differences 
in thinking involve higher cognitive processes, 
which are demonstrably caused by language. (pp. 
366–367)
In the following section, we will review the relevant litera-
ture against the above criteria.
Language and colour perception
Early studies investigated colour perception and nam-
ing as a means of supporting the Whorfian hypothesis. 
Brown and Lennenberg (1954) found a positive cor-
relation between recognition of a given colour and its 
‘codability’ (i.e., its categorisation under a concept that 
is represented with a word). However, the researchers 
acknowledged that these results did not qualify as sup-
port for a causal link between language and thought. 
Instead, it seems that the codability of a colour facilitates 
the recognition of that colour, rather than conclusively 
determining the colours that we can recognise. Hence, 
if we teach someone how to label given colour hues 
with (new) language terms, this could make the future 
recognition of those colours easier. In other words, the 
language vocabulary an individual holds, or the colour 
terms available in the language an individual speaks, does 
not seem to decisively constrain the recognition of unla-
beled colour variations. If the acquisition of new terms 
can readily facilitate recognition or even memorisation of 
the newly named colours, it seems implausible to argue 
that the language we speak disables us from entertaining 
thoughts produced within a different language (e.g., “this 
is colour x”). Moreover, if the spectrum of recognisable 
objects can be easily expanded or modified, it would be 
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hard to claim that this spectrum belongs to a fixed higher 
cognitive process. A number of studies that present this 
line of argument are presented below. 
Heider and Olivier (1972) examined the possible impact 
of the differences in colour terms used by different lan-
guages in the memorisation of those colours. They con-
ducted a cross-cultural study between English-speaking 
Americans and the Dani of Indonesian New Guinea. They 
found no significant differences in the memory task. 
However, the Dani speakers tended to use the two colour 
terms existing in their own language, while the English 
speakers tended to use the basic eleven colour terms of 
the English language. In spite of this, Roberson, Davies, 
and Davidoff (2000) replicated Heider’s and Olivier’s study 
using English-speaking participants and the Berinmo of 
Papua New Guinea. They found differences in the key 
memory measures. 
These inconsistent results support criticism about the 
design of such experiments. In particular, Munnich and 
Landau (2003) argue that this kind of experimental design 
does not really test the influence of language on non-lin-
guistic tasks (and thus non-linguistic thought). Indeed, it 
makes sense that if an individual has more available colour 
terms in their vocabulary, it should be easier for them to 
memorise the variations of colours that they have seen. 
However, this interpretation of the above studies implies 
that the processes of both categorisation and naming are 
utilised in the memory tasks. Therefore, we cannot regard 
this as an influence of language on non-linguistic thinking.
The inluence of language on spatial cognition
Other studies overcome the above difficulties with linguis-
tic mediation in assumed non-linguistic tasks by examin-
ing the influence of language on spatial cognition. Brown 
and Levinson (1993) investigated the differences in how 
Dutch speakers and South American Mayans (who speak 
the language Tzeltal) understand non-verbal spatial ori-
entation since Dutch and Tzeltal exhibit different usage 
of spatial words. In particular, while Dutch uses a relative 
frame of reference for locating objects (e.g., object A is to 
the left of the observer), Tzeltal uses an absolute frame of 
reference (e.g., object A is to the north of the observer). 
Thus, Tzeltal speakers would still identify object A at the 
north of the observer, even if the body was turned 180 
degrees. Within a relative frame of reference, left would 
become right. Brown and Levinson first asked partici-
pants from both groups to identify a sole arrow on a first 
table. They then turned participants 180 degrees to face 
a second table with two arrows on it and asked them to 
identify which one was the same as on the first table. The 
researchers found that Tzeltal speakers consistently used 
an absolute frame of reference to re-identify the original 
arrow, while Dutch speakers identified the original arrow 
in relation to the new position (e.g., left became right). 
This study is regarded as direct support for the Whorfian 
hypothesis, since in the study it was possible “to directly 
infer from non-linguistic behaviour the general nature of 
the conceptual representation used to code spatial arrays 
in memory” (Brown and Leninson, 1993, p. 6).
Li and Gleitman (2002) conducted a variation of the 
previous experiment exclusively among English speak-
ers and demonstrated that changing the environment in 
which the spatial tasks occur can also change the frame 
of reference used. In particular, they found that partici-
pants tended to use an absolute frame of reference in a 
more natural, information-rich environment, in compari-
son with a minimal environment. This contrasts with the 
findings of Brown and Levinson (1993), as both Dutch and 
English have the same linguistic features. These results 
may not rule out the influence of linguistic structures to 
thought, but they certainly weaken the Whorfian hypoth-
esis. If alterations in the environment of spatial cognition 
can override predispositions imposed by language, then 
the assertion that the way we speak decisively determines 
the thoughts we can have is doubtful. 
Language and spatial representation of events 
in time
However, Boroditsky, Fuhrman, and McCormick (2011) 
make a strong case for linguistic determinism that con-
trasts with the above argument. They conducted an 
experiment with native English and Mandarin speakers. 
All participants were instructed in English to press the 
correct button on a computer keyboard to indicate the 
temporal relationship between two images that they had 
previously seen on a screen. Buttons were arranged hori-
zontally (i.e., left/right) for the first group and vertically 
(i.e., top/bottom) for the second group. They found that 
only native Mandarin speakers responded faster when 
the ‘earlier response button’ was on the top of the ‘later 
response button’, compared with when it was on the bot-
tom. This is consistent with the use of vertical metaphors 
for temporal events in the Mandarin language, whereby 
earlier events are placed ‘higher’ and later events are 
placed ‘lower’ in an imaginary vertical axis. In addition, 
it would be difficult to claim that the dependent variable 
(i.e., pressing buttons placed either horizontally or verti-
cally on a computer keyboard) was mediated by linguistic 
representations.
On the other hand, January and Kako’s study (2007, as 
cited in Green, 2010) showed that a short learning ses-
sion can change the way in which native English speak-
ers depict temporal relations in space. The researchers 
trained participants to press a button placed on top of 
a computer keyboard for previous events in time and 
another button placed below for subsequent events. It 
was shown that learning made participants switch their 
thinking from the horizontal metaphors naturally used 
in the English language to the vertical metaphors used by 
Mandarin speakers. 
Linguistic relativity
These findings lead us towards linguistic relativity instead 
of linguistic determinism. Lucy (1997) describes the role 
of language in linguistic relativity as: “Language embod-
ies an interpretation of reality and language can inluence 
thought about that reality” (Lucy, 1997, p. 294). Elsewhere, 
Slobin (1987) makes an insightful argument that may 
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provide reconciliation between linguistic relativity and 
linguistic determinism:
‘…language influences thought, when we are think-
ing with the intent to use language (…) having 
thought about a topic with a view to talking about 
it, we select from a set of words available to us 
when we wish to express those thoughts.’ (p. 437). 
Hence, we can have various thoughts that are not neces-
sarily constrained by the characteristics of our native lan-
guage (e.g., metaphors, ways of spatial orientation, colour 
categories, syntactic structures, etc.). Yet when we wish to 
express these thoughts, we tend to utilise and be influ-
enced by the available resources of our native language. 
However, the above does not account for people who 
have been bilingual for their whole lives. Indeed, bilingual-
ism poses a significant challenge to the Whorfian hypoth-
esis. If both languages are equally weighted, but differ in 
their linguistic representations, which language governs 
the bilingual individual’s way of thinking? Research shows 
that actually there is no first or second language for bilin-
guals and that they are able to adjust their ways of think-
ing depending on which language they are speaking at 
that moment in time (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2008). 
As such, the possibility exists that individuals can gener-
ally switch their ways of thinking as they switch the lan-
guage they speak. Boroditksy et al. (2010) suggest that this 
is not the case, since Mandarin participants maintained 
the vertical concept of time, even though they had suffi-
cient English language capabilities. However, as was dem-
onstrated above with English speakers (January & Kako, 
2007, as cited in Green, 2010) it is possible that Mandarin 
speakers could be trained to use the appropriate struc-
tures or metaphors that are commonly used in the context 
of the English language. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the impact of language 
depends on the means through which we express our 
thoughts. For example, Brysbaert, Fias, and Noel (1998) 
demonstrated that the differences in numerical cogni-
tion between Dutch and French speakers disappeared 
when subjects were asked to type their answers rather 
than pronounce them. This provides evidence for the 
significant interference of modality of expression within 
linguistic relativity. 
Conclusions
Overall, we could argue that speakers of one language 
seem to be able to consciously use their learning capa-
bilities to practice the spatial and/or other ways of think-
ing that are common in another language. As Slobin 
(1987) implies, if an individual can adjust their thoughts 
when they intend to express them in a certain language, 
they are also probably able to alter other learned ways 
of thinking (e.g., metaphorical thinking about time). 
Nevertheless, Boroditsky et al. (2010) have shown that 
participants do not always engage in such learning and 
utilise their natural way of thinking (i.e., as depicted in 
their native tongue). 
Areas for future research
As shown above, the question of how and to what extent 
learning can change the cognitive patterns that are pre-
sent in our native language is certainly an interesting area 
for future research. 
Another interesting topic is the extent to which our ways 
of thinking also depend on their varying environments. As 
we saw above, Li and Gleitman (2002) illustrated the effect 
of an information-rich environment versus a minimal one 
in spatial cognition. It is possible that other variations 
in the environmental context could have similar effects 
on linguistically dependent thought too. For example, 
depending on the language we communicate with, and to 
whom we are talking, we may be able to temporarily switch 
our modes of thinking. Of course, this approach entails a 
radically broader framework than linguistic determinism 
and linguistic relativity, since we would no longer consider 
the effects of language on non-linguistic thinking. Instead, 
we would regard language as only one of the varying com-
ponents of the environment that flexibly influences our 
modes of thinking. This approach would also have to inves-
tigate the broader cultural and social factors involved in 
thinking as a means of verbal or written communication. 
This provides another interesting area for future research. 
One such area is counterfactual thinking. This is a 
multi-faceted area of study that arguably involves higher 
cognitive processes. Bloom (1981, as cited in Lucy, 1997) 
compared counterfactual thinking between English 
speakers and speakers of different varieties of the Chinese 
language. He found that the linguistic resources available 
in the two languages contributed to sustaining a par-
ticular mode of counterfactual reasoning. However, Au’s 
(1983) study shows that monolingual Chinese speakers 
(who were not familiar with the English subjunctive) were 
able to give counterfactual interpretations of a given story 
as much as native English speakers did, despite the fact 
that the mastery of the English subjunctive is tangential 
to counterfactual reasoning in Chinese. As such, this find-
ing directly contradicts Bloom’s above claim. 
Therefore, it would be interesting for future research 
to examine how a culturally situated modality (e.g., coun-
terfactual thinking in the Chinese language and culture) 
could be altered or paralleled with another language. This 
could occur either through learning, as January and Kako 
(2007, as cited in Green, 2010) demonstrated, or through 
the existence of a different context. In fact, despite the 
wide variety of grammatical structures and semantic rep-
resentations found in different languages, it seems pos-
sible for a speaker to shift thinking between the different 
meanings and structures (e.g., use of metaphors) embod-
ied in those languages (Langacker, 1976). 
In conclusion, I attempted here to argue that the available 
evidence from the literature supports the hypothesis of (a 
flexible) linguistic relativity, instead of the linguistic deter-
minism hypothesis. Moreover, I supported the idea that the 
impact of language on thought is not only mediated by the 
intention of an individual to express their thoughts, but 
also by the environmental and cultural context, and their 
ability to learn different modes of reasoning.
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